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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT was once considered to be "pro-patent"-that
is, a highly desirable circuit within which to sue a patent infringer.
Today the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits are believed by many attor-
neys to be even more pro-patent than the Seventh. The pro- or anti-
patent reputation of a circuit is determined primarily by the decisional-
law its judges generate, and Seventh Circuit judges have recently been
applying relatively high standards of patentability to the inventions they
have had occasion to review. Despite loss of some of its "pro-patent"
reputation, the Seventh Circuit still handles a large number of patent
lawsuits-perhaps more than any other circuit. Because they are fre-
quently called upon to handle patent litigation, Seventh Circuit judges
at both the district and appellate court levels have more patent-law
expertise than do the judges in most other federal circuits. This exper-
tise is apparent in the decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Careful review of these decisions indicates that the trial and appellate
judges of the Seventh Circuit are, by and large, fully competent to
handle all the technical complexities of patent litigation.
During the past year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
handed down about 20 decisions relating to patent law. A number of
these decisions are concerned with establishing the limits of two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions-Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation1 and Lear, Inc., v. Ad-
kins.' A number of the other Seventh Circuit decisions are concerned
with interesting points of patent law, such as: whether attorneys fees,
awardable "in exceptional cases" under 35 U.S.C. § 2853 of the federal
patent law, can be awarded even in the absence of any fraud; whether
the distribution of sample products for experimental use is a sale that
* Research Attorney for the American Bar Foundation and Lecturer at IT/
Chicago-Kent and Northwestern University Law Schools. Formerly a patent attorney;
member Illinois Bar and registered to practice before the United States Patent Office;
J.D., University of Michigan.
1. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
2. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) provides:
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.
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can invalidate a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b); 4 and whether a
device can infringe a patent when part of that device had not been
invented at the time the patent was applied for and was used in an in-
fringing device as a substitute for an important element of the patented
arrangement. The following discussion first treats those cases that
interpret the two recent Supreme Court decisions. The remaining de-
cisions of interest are then discussed under appropriate headings. A
final brief note considers the advisability of establishing a central court
of appeals for all patent cases, as has been proposed.
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AS APPLIED
To PATENT LITIGATION
The 1971 Supreme Court decision Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation5 changed the existing law and
established the doctrine that once a patent is held invalid by one court,
the holding of invalidity can be pleaded by a second defendant as an
estoppel against enforcement of the same patent in later litigation be-
fore any court. Prior to Blonder-Tongue, it was possible for a patent
owner to sue a first infringer, have his patent declared invalid, and later
sue a second infringer (typically in a more favorable forum) and have
the same patent declared valid." The Blonder-Tongue decision has
substantially reduced the amount of re-litigation of patents that occurs
in this country. Unfortunately for some patent owners whose patents
were held to be invalid prior to Blonder-Tongue, it has cut off the right
of such patent owners to take a "second bite of the apple" in a more
favorable forum. Two Seventh Circuit cases involved attempts by such
patent owners to have pre-Blonder-Tongue judgments of patent in-
validity limited to certain claims of their patents so that other claims
could be re-litigated. Before considering these two cases, however, an
explanation of patent claims is in order.
Every patent has appended to it a number of claims each of which
defines the invention using slightly different terminology.' During the
4. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970) provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date
of the application for the patent in the United States.
5. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
6. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936). "Neither reason nor authority
supports the contention that adjudication adverse to any or all the claims of a patent
precludes another suit upon the same claims against a different defendant."
7. See generally 5 WALKER ON PATENTS § 445 (Deller ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as WALKER ON PATENTS).
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prosecution of an application for a patent before the Patent Office, the
patent examiner directs most of his attention to the claims portion of
the application. The patent applicant must satisfy the examiner that
each claim submitted in the application defines an invention which is
useful, new and not obvious.8 In many foreign countries, a single pat-
ent is permitted to claim only one basic invention. In these foreign
countries, every patent is required to include one claim that is broader
than and encompasses within its scope all of the remaining claims in
the same patent.' In the United States, claims of distinctly differing
scope are generally permitted in a single patent, provided the patent
examiner is able to examine all of the claims in a single search through
the Patent Office files of prior-art arrangements. 10 If the examiner de-
cides that a second search is required before he can examine some of
the claims in a patent application, he may require a division of the ap-
plication into two or more separate patent applications, each of which
might ultimately mature into a separate patent." However, it often
happens that claims directed to related but somewhat different inven-
tions or decidedly different aspects of the same invention are contained
within a single patent. It is also the accepted practice in the United
States for patent applicants to have many claims in their applications
which cover essentially the same invention in varying ways.' 2 For ex-
ample, if the actual device constructed by the patent applicant includes
forty different elements, the applicant typically may apply for a patent
containing ten to twenty claims, each defining the invention as compris-
ing different sub-combinations of perhaps five to twenty of the forty
elements. In such a case, it is difficult if not impossible to say whether
a patent containing such claims is directed to multiple inventions or to
minor variations on a single invention.
Two cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during this past term
are directed to the following question: If certain claims of a patent
are specifically held to be invalid, does the invalidity of those claims
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970).
9. This rule is followed in Canada and England, among other countries. See gen-
erally Kirby, Unity of Invention in Canada, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 250 (1957).
10. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDUREs § 808.02 (3rd ed. 1974) [here-
inafter cited as M.P.E.P.]. This Manual is published by the Patent Office for use by
its examiners, applicants or their representatives.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1970). The Examiner may require division for other reasons
as well.
12. M.P.E.P. supra, note 10 § 706.03(k) states: "[C]ourt decisions have confirmed
applicant's right to restate (i.e., by plural claiming) his invention in a reasonable num-
ber of ways. Indeed, a mere difference in scope between claims has been held to be
enough."
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give rise to an estoppel in a different lawsuit under Blonder-Tongue
against the assertion of the remaining patent claims?
In Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics,
Inc."5 the court permitted a defendant to assert the estoppel doctrine
against claims which were not specifically litigated in an earlier action.
Claim number 10 of the patent had been previously held invalid. The
patent owner was asserting claims 11 through 13 against a new defend-
ant. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in its decision that
"a reading of claims 10, 11, 12, and 13 demonstrates the complete
dependence of claims 11, 12, and 13 upon claim 10."' 4 The only dif-
ference between claims 11, 12, and 13 and claim 10 is that claims 11
through 13 require particular types of conventional printing techniques
in a printing step of the claimed invention, whereas claim 10 simply
calls for "printing." Claim 11 calls for letter-press printing, claim 12
calls for offset printing, and claim 13 calls for reproduction by photo-
mechanical means. The Seventh Circuit decided that these claims
were essentially identical to claim 10 and contained no inventive sub-
stance which would support their validity above and beyond the validity
of claim 10. In this instance, where the claims were almost identical
and clearly related to the same basic invention, the decision reached
by the court is correct.
The second case considered by the court of appeals is a much
more difficult one. In Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co.,", the court
considered the validity of a patent directed to an electrical device called
a "variable resistor." The patent contained twenty-two claims. An
earlier judgment specifically held only claims 1, 2, 11, 14, 15, 16, and
20 to be invalid, 6 but the opinion which accompanied the earlier judg-
ment contained language which indicated that the entire patent was in-
13. 484 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 908-09. The claims are set forth in footnote 7 of the court's opinion.
The court is holding claims 11-13 to be subject to the estoppel because they are, in es-
sence, identical to claim 10-not because they are technically dependent upon claim 10
in that they incorporate claim 10 by reference. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) where the
concept of dependent claims is introduced. It is thus unfortunate that the court used
the word "dependence" in its holding, for the court's use of this word may lead some
to believe that the invalidity of claims 11-13 follows from their technical dependence
upon claim 10 under section 112 rather than from their being essentially identical to
claim 10. Such an interpretation of this case cannot be reconciled with 35 U.S.C. §
282 (1970) which reads in part ". . . dependent claims shall be presumed valid even
though dependent upon an invalid claim ....
15. 480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 1094 (1973).
16. "Claims 1, 2, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 2,777,926 are invalid
..Id. at 124.
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valid.17 A difficult question was thus raised as to whether the earlier
judgment should estop the owner of the patent from asserting the re-
maining claims against a different defendant at a later time.
At the second trial, the new defendants moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the entire patent was invalidated by the opin-
ion and judgment in the earlier action. Although the motion was
granted the district court did not consider the specific wording of the
claims. The district court held that the plaintiff was estopped by
Blonder-Tongue from asserting the validity of any of his claims.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the
grounds that the actual order entered following the earlier trial was
specifically limited to the claims listed in the order. The court found
that the plaintiff was not estopped to assert the remaining claims
against different defendants at a later time. Accordingly, the judgment
was reversed to the extent that the holding of the district court pre-
cluded all litigation under the claims which had not been specifically
held to 'be invalid.
One aspect not examined by the court in Bourns is the actual
patent claims to see whether the claims not invalidated are substantially
identical to the claims that were invalidated by the earlier judgment.
Such an examination would seem necessary in any case before a ra-
tional decision on the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel can be
made. Clearly it would not be proper to estop one from asserting a
claim relating to an invention that is entirely separate and distinct from
any invention defined by the invalidated claims, for to do so would be
to penalize an inventor for the patent examiner's failure to require the
filing of separate applications directed to distinct inventions. In a case
such as Technograph, however, there is no point in re-litigating when
the distinctions between the various claims are truly minimal and of
no inventive significance. Re-litigation on the issue of claim identity
seems necessary in a case such as Bourns.
A relevant case in another circuit is Westwood Chemical, Inc. v.
Molded Fiber Glass Body Co.' 8 In that case, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a trial court decision that the unadjudicated claims
in a patent presented questions of fact identical to those presented by
17. Bourns, Inc. v. Dale Electronics, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Neb. 1969).
and the '926 patent is held to be invalid.'" This statement was relied upon by
the district court in Bourns, Inc. v. Allen Bradley Co., 348 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
in concluding that the court in Dale intended to hold the entire patent invalid.
18. 498 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1974).
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the adjudicated claims and merely restated them without significant dif-
ference and without defining an invention separate and apart from that
defined in the adjudicated claims. On appeal, the defendants con-
tended that the holding of the trial court was inconsistent with 35
U.S.C. §282, providing that "each claim of a patent. . . shall be pre-
sumed valid independently of the validity of other claims." The court
of appeals found no merit in the contention and affirmed the trial court
in all respects. It distinguished Bourns on the grounds that "Bourns
was decided on a motion for summary judgment and claim identity was
not an issue in the case."'19
The Blonder-Tongue doctrine of estoppel should not necessarily
be limited to the claims found within a single patent. It frequently
happens that two patents will issue containing similar claims or claims
directed essentially to a single invention. If the claims are substantially
identical and if the patents are commonly owned, then the invalidity
of claims in one of the patents should estop the common owner from
asserting the claims in the other patent at a later time. To hold other-
wise would be to permit an inventor to circumvent Blonder-Tongue by
dividing his claims between several distinct patents. The issuance of
two patents containing similar claims or claims directed to the same in-
vention can occur when two or more separate inventors contribute to
different aspects of an invention. For example, if A invents a novel
method of manufacturing and if A and B then jointly invent a novel
apparatus for implementing that method, separate patents might issue
-one to A directed to the method, and a second to A and B jointly,
directed to the apparatus. Ownership might then be united by assign-
ment. Two patents containing similar claims can also result if a patent
examiner imposes an improper division requirement upon a patent ap-
plication and forces the applicant to seek separate patents for claims
which should have been contained in a single patent. It also occasion-
ally happens that the Patent Office mistakenly issues two patents cover-
ing the same invention to two different applicants and both applicants
later sell their patents to a common assignee. Evidence of claim simi-
larity can sometimes be found in actions of the common owner. If the
owner arranges to have two patents issue on the same day or if he
voluntarily gives up the last few years of his monopoly on one patent
so that it expires on the same day as another patent, arguably he is
taking steps to protect himself against the possible accusation that he
has fraudulently extended his statutory seventeen-year monopoly by
19. Id. at 117-18.
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obtaining two patents which together give him more than the normal
seventeen years of patent protection on a single invention. When a
patent owner takes such steps in response to a "double-patenting" re-
jection of his claims by a patent examiner,20 he thereby concedes to
the examiner that his two or more patents are directed essentially to
the same invention. In this situation, the owner should be estopped
from claiming that his patents are directed to distinct inventions at a
later time.
The other side of the estoppel question is that of determining
when a non-party to a suit should be bound by a judgment of patent
validity. Blonder-Tongue is not applicable to that situation and the
rules are quite different. In TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp.,2 the court
was faced with deciding whether or not the supplier of a component
part was bound by a decision holding a patent valid against one of his
customers. The defendant, TRW, manufactured power steering
pumps many of which were sold to the Ford Motor Company. In an
earlier suit, the Ellipse Corporation had obtained a judgment of patent
infringement against Ford Motor Company. The judgment was partly
based upon Ford selling power steering pumps supplied to Ford by
TRW. TRW manufactured approximately 35% of Ford's require-
ments for power steering pumps and was also contractually obligated
to indemnify Ford for the cost of any patent litigation on the pumps.
TRW's attorneys had filed amicus briefs during the Ford litigation in
support of Ford's position. TRW could have voluntarily entered the
Ford litigation.
In this declaratory judgment action brought by TRW to invalidate
the patent, Ellipse argued that TRW was in privity with Ford and
should therefore be barred now from attacking the validity of the pat-
ent. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the argument
but decided that TRW did not participate extensively enough in the
earlier litigation to be bound by its outcome. 2
20. M.P.E.P. supra, note 10 § 804 states: "The other type is the 'obviousness' type
double patenting rejection which is a judicially created doctrine based on public policy
rather than statute and is primarily intended to prevent prolongation of monopoly by
prohibiting claims in a second patent not patently distinguishing from claims in a first
patent. . . . [ihe 'obviousness' type double patenting rejection may be obviated by
a terminal disclaimer [of the last few years of the patent grant so that both patents ex-
pire on the same day]." M.P.E.P. § 804.02 adds: ". . . [S]uch terminal disclaimers
must include a provision that the patent shall expire immediately if it ceases to be com-
monly owned with the other application or patent." RULES OF PRACTICE IN PATENT
CASES 321(b) (U.S. Patent Office 1970).
21. 495 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1974).
22. Id. at 318. The court stated: "TRW limited its role in the prior suit to observ-
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The court then considered the issue whether a justiciable contro-
versy actually existed between the parties. TRW argued that Ellipse's
allegation of infringement against Ford respecting power steering
pumps, some of which were manufactured by TRW, was sufficient
to serve as a basis for the filing of a declaratory judgment suit. Ellipse
countered 'by pointing out that the earlier Ford litigation had been tried
to judgment and, therefore, the controversy was now terminated. The
court ultimately decided that since the patent holder did not make a
charge of infringement against the manufacturer TRW independently
of the customer Ford, and since the litigation against the customer Ford
had been terminated, no justiciable controversy remained to be de-
cided. Accordingly, the court held that a declaratory judgment action
at this point in time was inappropriate.
The contractual obligation to indemnify Ford for all practical pur-
poses rendered TRW a party to the earlier litigation, albeit not a named
party. TRW relied upon the skill of the attorneys retained by Ford
to defend its substantial interest in the outcome of the earlier litigation.
There is very little meaningful distinction between that situation and
the situation where TRW actually comes forward to defend the suit
against Ford using its own attorneys. Yet perhaps it would be unfair
to bind TRW to the original judgment when TRW did not actually con-
trol the course of the earlier litigation. TRW's liability to indemnify
Ford might have been too small to justify TRW entering the earlier
litigation or perhaps TRW sold much larger quantities of the same de-
vice to another automotive manufacturer. Under these circumstances,
would it be fair to bar TRW from attacking the validity of the patent
at a later time if sued directly for damages for patent infringement re-
sulting from its other sales? These arguments are compelling, but prob-
ably the ends of justice are best served by barring TRW from re-
litigating the validity of this same patent at a later time, if TRW's finan-
cial interest in the earlier litigation was substantial.
THE RIGHT OF A LICENSEE TO ATTACK THE
VALIDITY OF A PATENT
In the recent decision, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 23 the Supreme Court
announced for the first time that a licensee under a patent has the right
ing the proceedings and to filing amicus curiae briefs. These are insufficient modes of
participation to render applicable the doctrine of res judicata . . . and therefore TRW
is not bound by the adjudication of the validity of the claim .
23. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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to attack the validity of a patent in court even though such an attack
is a violation or repudiation of the licensing contract. The rationale
behind the decision is that there is a strong public policy favoring the
prompt judicial testing of patents and the prompt weeding-out of in-
valid patents through litigation. Licensees are often the only parties
who have the interest and the resources to challenge a patent in court.
Accordingly, licensees should not be barred by contract from attacking
the validity of patents under which they are licensed.
Several cases decided in the Seventh Circuit during the past term
have considered the scope of the Lear decision. Maxon Premix
Burner Co., Inc. v. Eclipse Fuel Engineering Co.2" held that Lear is
inapplicable to a defendant who has gone through a trial on the merits
concerning infringement and who, after receiving an adverse judgment
from such a trial, wishes then to attack the validity of a patent he had
not previously questioned. It held that the defendant Eclipse had
waived any right it might otherwise have had to challenge the validity
of the patent by admitting during the course of trial "that the issue of
validity so far as the original claim is concerned is not here in issue."
The court recognized that the Lear decision would favor the testing
of the validity of patents in every case where it was possible to do so.
However, the court also noted a countervailing public policy which
favors "conservation of judicial time and limitations on expensive litiga-
tion."' 25 It concluded that the Lear doctrine could not be used by a
party to litigation after that party had received an adverse decision on
the merits.
In a decision seemingly inconsistent with the above decision, Kraly
v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp.,26 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Lear doctrine is fully applicable to a situation
in which the parties had earlier engaged in litigation but settled it by
agreeing upon a licensing arrangement. The earlier litigation was dis-
missed with prejudice. In that situation, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that Lear required the infringer to be given an oppor-
tunity to oppose the validity of the licensed patent at a later time.
In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit expressly refused to follow the holding
of an Ohio district court in Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v. King Alum-
inum Corp.27 Since that time, the Ohio court has reaffirmed its orig-
24. 471 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972) cert. den. 410 U.S. 929 (1972).
25. Id. at 312.
26. 502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974).
27. 369 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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inal holding28 and the Schlegel case is presently on appeal before the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. If the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirms the Schlegel holding, a conflict in the laws of the two circuits
will result.
An issue Lear did not settle is whether a licensee who success-
fully invalidates a patent can recover royalties paid while he was a i-
censee. In the Kraly case, the court did not permit the recovery of
such prior royalties, holding that such royalties were governed by the
consent decree until the licensing arrangement was repudiated by the
licensee under Lear. Accordingly, royalty payments made prior to re-
pudiation of the license could not be recovered by the licensee. In
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc.29 the court
went further and actually required a licensee to continue making peri-
odic payments under an agreement entered into in settlement of patent
litigation even though the patent was held invalid after the settlement
agreement was consumated. The court did not consider the agreement
to be a license agreement which could be challenged under Lear be-
cause the agreement was, on its face, an agreement to end litigation
in return for periodic payments which were intended to cover only past
infringement. The parties had entered into a separate written license
agreement which covered future use of the invention, and the licensor
did not attempt to collect under the separate license agreement after
his patent was held to be invalid. The court noted that this holding
would encourage licensees to attack the patents under which they are
licensed at an early date, since royalties for use of the licensed inven-
tion during any delay would have to be paid even if the patent were
ultimately found to be invalid.
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEES
Two cases in the Seventh Circuit have touched upon the recovery
of attorneys fees in patent litigation. In Strassheim Co. v. Gold Medal
Folding Furniture Co., 0 the court awarded the prevailing defendant
his attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 28531 even in the absence of
fraudulent conduct by the plaintiff. The court held that the award of
28. Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. King Aluminum Corp., 381 F.Supp. 649 (S.D. Ohio
1974).
29. 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973).
30. 477 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) provides:
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.
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attorneys fees to the defendant was appropriate, because several acts
on the part of the plaintiff were grossly negligent. These acts in-
cluded: (1) failure of plaintiff's attorneys to file a patent application
within one year after the invention went into public use; 32 (2) signing
of an oath by the inventors which said the patent application had been
filed less than a year after the invention went into public use;" and
(3) failure of the plaintiff owners of the patent to admit that the inven-
tion had been in public use for more than a year prior to filing the
patent application, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b), even when
specifically asked that question during discovery, and even though evi-
dence of the public use was available to them. This is a significant
case because it bases the award of attorneys fees under section 285
on something less than fraud.
In Scotch Whisky Association v. Barton Distilling Co., 4 the Sev-
enth Circuit set aside an award of attorneys fees by the district court
in a trademark action under the Lanham Act. An agent of the defend-
ant was shown to have sold as "Scotch Whisky" a blend of Scotch whis-
kies and spirits produced in Panama. The district court concluded that
the use of "Scotch Whisky" was a false designation of the place of ori-
gin which violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) and that the defendant was
responsible for this false designation. The district court enjoined de-
fendant from using the words "Scotch Whisky" on this product. There
is no provision in the Lanham Act comparable to section 285 of the
Patent Act (Title 35), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the general rule against recovery of attorneys fees should apply
since there was no overriding consideration of justice or defense main-
tained for oppressive reasons.
INFRINGEMENT OF A PATENT USING
NEWLY-INVENTED ELEMENTS
In Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff and Sons, Inc.,35 the inven-
tor filed an application on a method for laying pipes. Briefly de-
32. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970). This failure rendered the patent invalid.
33. The Patent Office oath, which must be signed by an inventor and attached to
his application, includes a statement that the inventor swears the invention has not been
on sale in the United States for more than a year prior to the filing of the application.
By signing this oath when they knew their invention had been on sale for more than
a year, the inventors committed perjury. For the current form of oath used by the Pat-
ent Office see RULES OF PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES 114, Form 11 (U.S. Patent Office
1970).
34. 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973).
35. 491 F,2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974).
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scribed, the method involved laying a first length of pipe and then shin-
ing a thin light beam down the central axis of this first length of pipe.
Second, third, and subsequent lengths of pipe are then laid and posi-
tioned such that their axes also coincide with the light beam. In this
manner, a nearly perfect alignment of the pipes is achieved quite easily.
One end of each length of pipe is attached to the preceding length of
pipe, and a bulls-eye target is placed over the opposite end of each
length of pipe. The opposite end is then shifted up or down and left
or right until the light ,beam strikes the center of the bulls-eye. The
pipe is then properly aligned with the preceding sections. In his claims,
the inventor described the light beam as a collimated narrow beam of
light.
At the time he filed, the inventor contemplated using a conven-
tional lamp plus one or more lenses to achieve the collimated beam
of light. Thereafter, the laser was invented, and it was immediately
adopted for use in the alignment of the pipes. The laser is apparently
superior to ordinary optical arrangements in its ability to generate a col-
limated narrow beam of light. The issue faced by the court was
whether the patent holder had the right to collect royalties from others
who were using his pipe-alignment method in every sense except that
they generated their collimated narrow beam of light with a laser rather
than with the optical arrangement actually disclosed in the patent.
The trial court held that there could be no infringement under
these circumstances. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
invention as claimed was a method invention and not an apparatus in-
vention. The patent claims which define the invention call for the step
of providing a collimated beam of light. The claims do not require the
beam to be generated by any particular type of source. Hence, there
is literal infringement of the claim language regardless of whether a
laser is used as the beam source.
If the patent claims had been apparatus claims directed to a pipe-
alignment apparatus and calling for a source capable of developing a
collimated beam of light, then fairness would seem to require the same
result to ,be reached. 'It would seem unjust to deprive an inventor of
royalties for the use of his invention simply because someone else came
up with an improved element well-suited for use in carrying out a step
of his invention. For example, after Edison invented the motion pic-
ture projector using an ordinary incandescent lamp, it would have been
unfair to prevent him from collecting royalties from one who con-
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structed an essentially identical motion picture projector using a fluor-
escent lamp (assuming of course that the fluorescent lamp had been
invented shortly after Edison's invention of the motion picture projec-
tor). The doctrine of equivalents in patent law should be applicable
in this case. This doctrine holds that the mere substitution of an equiv-
alent element for an element called for by a claim, especially in an at-
tempt to avoid literally infringing the claim, will not deprive the inven-
tor of his rightful royalties.8 6
Both the trial court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to this situation.
Both courts were troubled by a line of authority holding that there can
be no infringement in this type of situation.17 To avoid the impact
of the line of authority, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ulti-
mately decided that infringement could be found if the newly-invented
laser element was in existence before the patent issued, even if it was
not in existence when the patent application was filed, for the claim
language is not finalized until a patent issues."8 The issue date of a
patent is the beginning of the seventeen-year period during which the
inventor is privileged to enjoy his patent monopoly. 9 It can be af-
fected arbitrarily by such things as the backlog of patent printing within
the Patent Office, the number of refilings of his application indulged
in by an applicant, and the number of appeals that an applicant files
within and without the Patent Office. The issue date should not,
therefore, -be decisive to affect the scope of a patent in this manner.
The line of decisions that troubled the courts should have no applicability
when a newly-invented element is used as a direct substitute or replace-
ment for an old element and does not otherwise change the basic na-
ture or teachings of an invention. An inventor should be entitled to
collect royalties on improved versions of his invention. He should not
be able to collect royalties on different inventions which, while possibly
equivalent in end use to his, are not in accord with his teachings.
36. WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 7 § 546 et seq. (1972).
37. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
38. See generally Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1871). "[T]he inventor . . .
cannot treat any one as an infringer whose machine does not contain all of the material
ingredients of the prior combination . . . unless the latter machine employs as a substi-
tute for an ingredient left out to perform the same function some other ingredient which
was well known as a proper substitute for the same when the former invention was pat-
ented." Id. at 555-56 [emphasis added]. The Seventh Circuit is simply construing the
language "when . . . patented" to mean the date the patent issued and not the date the
application was filed.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLES FOR EXPERIMENTAL USE
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF AN APPLICATION
FOR A PATENT
In Dart Industries, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 4° the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the difficult problem
of deciding whether the sale of an invention more than a year before
the filing of a patent application invalidates the patent under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) even when the invention had not actually been tested at the
time of the sale. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) invalidates a patent if the in-
vention was "in public use or on sale" more than a year before the
patent application filing date. In the particular matter before the
court, it was admitted that the inventor had manufactured and sold
limited quantities of a product called "roving granules" for experi-
mental use by a number of manufacturers. It was established at the
trial that the quantity of material supplied was de minimis and not suf-
ficient for manufacturing and that, therefore, the purchasers were
simply buying experimental lots to test. It was also established that
-the inventor had never previously tested this material himself by using
it in an injection mold because the inventor himself had no equipment
with which to carry out injection molding; he assumed it to be satis-
factory because he found that it could be passed through a hole with
relative ease, unlike some prior known materials. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the sale invalidated the patent. Since the
patented product underwent no changes after the sales for experi-
mental use, since the sales were final, and since laboratory work had
demonstrated to the inventor's satisfaction that the invention would
work even though it had never been tested, the court held that these
were actual sales which would bar the filing of a patent application at
the end of a year. As additional support for the decision, the court
noted that the inventor was actively attempting to solicit large-scale
sales at the time the samples were sold and thus he was not simply
distributing the materials for experimental use.
This decision holds that an invention may be "on sale" under sec-
tion 102 (b) prior to the time when the invention is actually tested
if the inventor is satisfied that the invention has been completed.
The test applied is a subjective one-whether the inventor himself is
satisfied with his invention. In another area of patent law, an objective
test is used to determine when an invention has been completed. If
40, 489 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1973).
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two persons, both claiming to be the first to invent, apply for patents
on the same invention, a patent is normally awarded only to the person
who filed first. However, a patent is awarded to the person who filed
last if he can show that he conceived the invention first and then
worked at the invention "diligently" until he had "reduced it to prac-
tice" by constructing and testing a device that embodied the inven-
tion.4 In a contest between two inventors, a "reduction to practice"
must be demonstrated objectively, and the inventor's good-faith belief
that he has reduced his invention to practice is not sufficient proof that
he has tested his invention. For example, the purported inventor of
an electronic counter that utilized a special type of magnetic core satis-
fied himself that the invention would work by testing the properties of
the core using a test circuit. Since he did not construct an actual coun-
ter that contained the core, he failed to reduce his invention to practice
objectively on the day he conducted his tests. He could not show dili-
gence from that day until he filed his application, so 'the magnetic-core-
counter invention was awarded to another who was the first to file.42
In situations such as these where the invention is actually com-
plete at the time the inventor believes his invention is complete, the
subjective test is the better test. An inventor's good-faith belief that
he has completed his invention should justify his cessation of diligent
efforts toward completing the invention. If it later turns out that this
belief is erroneous -and that the invention is not complete, then natu-
rally priority might justifiably be awarded to another. The objective
test simply penalizes an inventor who fails to test out his invention as
rigorously as others may think is desirable.
PRIORITY BETWEEN TWO INVENTORS
In Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,4" the Seventh Cir-
cuit faced the unusual task of reviewing a determination of the Patent
Office Board of Patent Interferences as to which of two inventors was
first to invent a particular device. An interference proceeding is nor-
mally initiated by a patent examiner when he finds two applications
are claiming essentially -the same invention. An interference may also
be initiated between an application and a recently-issued patent. The
Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences is a special board within
the Patent Office that decides interference proceedings. Appeals from
41. WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 7 § 31.
42. Elmore v. Schmitt, 278 F.2d 510 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
43. 477 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1973).
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the decisions of this Board may be taken either to the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, as in the magnetic-core-counter case discussed
above, or to a district court, as in the present case. The decision of
a district court is then reviewable by the court of appeals.
In Chainbelt, the invention related to vibratory conveyors of a -type
which are driven by a motor. Previously, the speed of such a conveyor
was varied by adjusting the mechanical coupling between the motor
and the conveyor. The invention which both parties to the interfer-
ence were claiming resided in controlling the speed of the conveyor
by altering -the voltage supplied to the driving motor. While this might
seem to be an obvious expedient, those skilled in the art apparently
believed that the motor voltage could not be reduced without damaging
the motor through overheating.
One party claimed ,to have made the invention five years before
the application was filed. In fact, he had done little more than recog-
nize that the speed of a conveyor could be controlled by varying the
input voltage to the conveyor motor without damaging the motor. He
did not follow through by working out the particulars of a specific volt-
age-controlling arrangement and he did not take the necessary steps
to reduce the invention to practice by constructing a working model."
In all likelihood, he was not a sole inventor but a joint inventor with
others who contributed to his basic idea by designing the necessary
voltage controller. 5  Priority for the invention was awarded to the
party who was first -to file his application.
ANTICIPATION AND OBVIOUSNESS
A patent claim is anticipated, and therefore invalid, if 'the inven-
tion defined by the claim was publicly known a full year before the
patent application was filed4 I or prior to the date of invention by the
patentee. 47 A patent claim is obvious, and therefore invalid, if the sub-
ject matter of the invention is an obvious variation on or combination
of known prior arrangements, where obviousness is measured subjec-
tively with reference to "a person having ordinary skill in the art to
44. WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 7 § 31.
45. Id. § 39.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1970) provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... (a) the invention was known
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publica-
tion in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent. ...
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which said subject matter pertains. 48
In Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Electric, Inc.49 the question before
the court was whether Popeil's "Steam Set" curler heating device,
which comprises a steam chamber within which curlers are mounted
for heating, was fully anticipated by prior patents that disclosed the
heating of curlers in boiling water, and the heating of a conventional
curling iron in steam. There was also evidence of public use of the
invention in Japan more than a year before the application was filed.
The trial court decided that these prior patents and the public use of
the invention in Japan fully anticipated the invention under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (b). Normally, to anticipate under section 102 (b), the prior
patents must disclose the invention in all respects. The technique of
boiling curlers in water as disclosed in some of the prior patents is not
identical to the alternative technique of heating curlers in steam. How-
ever, the patent claims did not expressly limit the scope of the invention
to the use of steam only, so that the claims were broad enough in terms
to encompass within -their scope prior-art arrangements which boiled
the curlers in water. The claims were thus clearly invalid.
The patent owner tried to persuade the trial judge to limit the
scope of the claims, by judicial construction, to the heating of curlers
using steam. The trial judge challenged him to come up with some
reason why heating curlers with steam was better than heating curlers
in boiling water. The patent owner argued that less mineral deposits
would be found upon curlers heated in steam than upon curlers heated
in boiling water. The judge held this to be a negligible advantage be-
cause of the extremely small amount of moisture that has to be present
upon a hair curler to obtain good results. The court of appeals agreed:
"There is no evidence that the mineral content of such minute amounts
of moisture would significantly affect the user's hair. The purported
advantage is a distinction without a difference. The issue of anticipa-
tion by prior art is not determined by insubstantial distinctions between
a purported invention and prior art."50
The decision is interesting because of the discussion whether heat-
48. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains . . ..
49. 494 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1974).
50. Id. at 165.
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ing curlers in steam is more advantageous than boiling curlers in water.
The court seems to be saying that if the patent owner had shown a
substantial advantage in using steam rather than hot water to heat curl-
ers, and if the steam-heating technique were not previously known, the
court might have judicially construed the patent claims to cover only
the heating of curlers in steam. So construed, the claims would not
have been anticipated by the known technique of heating curlers in
boiling water. The court would thus be giving equitable relief to an
inventor who overclaimed his invention, when the invention would
have had substantial merit had it been claimed more narrowly. In re-
quiring the inventor ,to demonstrate that his invention is superior to
prior arrangements, as well as new and unobvious, the court is intro-
ducing into the United States patent law the German patent-law re-
quirement that a patentable invention must always advance the state
of the art.
In another recent Seventh Circuit decision, Continental Oil Co.
v. Witco Chemical Corp.,5' the court of appeals determined -that the
district court had made no findings evaluating the difference between
the prior art and ,the invention, upon which the district court could base
its holding that 'the patent was valid. The court of appeals therefore
undertook the task for itself and did a creditable job of acting as a sub-
stitute finder-of-fact. The Patent Office had refused to grant the pat-
entee any claims directed 'to his process, but it permitted him -to obtain
claims directed to the product which resulted from application of the
unpatentable process. In a case of this 'type, where the invention is
a chemical reagent, there is often very little meaningful difference be-
tween product claims and claims directed to the method of manufac-
turing the product. The court of appeals noted this fact and ultimately
found the product claims to be invalid for obviousness 2 for the same
reasons that the process claims were held to be obvious by the Patent
Office.
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
A statutory presumption arises under 35 U.S.C. § 282 -that a claim
in an issued patent is valid.5" This presumption is particularly appli-
cable to the validity of a claim in relation to examples of prior known
51. 484 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1973).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970) in part reads as follows:
A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity of a
patent shall rest on a party asserting it ....
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arrangements actually considered by the patent examiner. In -the Con-
tinental Oil case and in two other recent cases, Henry Manufacturing
Co., Inc. v. Commercial Filters Corp.,54 and Speakman Co. v. Water
Saver Faucet Co., Inc.,5" the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals gave
very little weight to the presumption of validity. In recognizing that
the presumption has been overcome, the court of appeals usually notes
that it has before it examples of prior known arrangements not consid-
ered by the patent examiner. However, these examples are often
quite similar to the examples which the patent examiner had before
him, and often the court is in fact simply disagreeing with the exam-
iner's decision on the patentability of an invention.
There is considerable justification for giving the statutory pre-
sumption of validity little weight. Formerly the Patent Office resolved
doubts in favor of an applicant for a patent. This so-called "rule of
doubt" was last given judicial application by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals as recently as 1966.56 Since that time, both the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Patent Office have formally
repudiated the rule of doubt as repugnant -to the statutory presumption
of validity. 57 However, some judges maintain that the rule is still fol-
lowed in practice, although it has been formally repudiated.58  As a
practical matter, patent examiners are under heavy pressure to dispose
of the applications before them and thereby reduce the backlog of
pending applications within the Patent Office, and they occasionally re-
solve 'their own doubts in favor of an applicant simply to dispose of
an application or to avoid an appeal. It is thus proper for the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to regard reliance upon the statutory pre-
sumption of validity as suspect.
It may be hoped that as the Patent Office gets its backlog of pend-
ing applications down to the point where individual examiners are not
under pressure to dispose of the backlog, and as more and more exam-
iners begin resolving all doubts against an applicant in accordance with
the formal Patent Office repudiation of the rule of doubt, the statutory
presumption of validity will fulfill its originally-intended purpose of
making it unnecessary for a court to second-guess the patent examiner
54. 489 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1972).
55. 497 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1974).
56. In re Hofstetter, 362 F.2d 293 (C.C.P.A. 1966), cert. granted sub. nom. Bren-
ner v. Hofstetter, 386 U.S. 990 (1967), vacated 389 U.S. 5 (1967).
57. Application of Naber, 503 F.2d 1059 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
58. See dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Worley in In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586,
593 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
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when the examples of prior-art before the court are substantially identi-
cal to the prior-art considered by the examiner.
SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO OBVIOUSNESS
In making any inquiry as to obviousness, it is customary for a court
to consider whether the invention would have been obvious to one
skilled in the art at the time it was claimed to have been invented. The
nature of the judicial inquiry is set forth in Graham v. John Deere
Co.: 5
Under Section 103, the scope and content of the prior art are
to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such sec-
ondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these
inquiries may have relevancy . . . . (Emphasis added.)
The question left unresolved by Graham is how much weight the
"secondary considerations" should be given in the determination
whether an invention is unpatentable because it is obvious. In two
cases handed down during the past year, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has opposed giving much weight to these secondary considera-
tions. In Research Corp. v. NASCO Industries, Inc.,60 the court af-
firmed a ruling of invalidity of a patent on summary judgment and re-
fused to consider any arguments that the invention had achieved great
commercial success and had answered a long-felt need. The invention
was a method of branding animals by freezing the skin of the animals
through the application to the animal's skin of a super-cooled material
such as dry ice. The relevant prior art consisted of an article published
many years before the patent was applied for, which disclosed that the
freezing of animal skin using dry ice caused either a permanent re-
growth of white hair on the area of skin frozen, or if prolonged, caused
the affected area to become bald. It was conceded that the article did
not teach the use of this freezing technique for the branding of animals
and that the patent holder was the first one ever to teach that freezing
could be used as a practical method of branding. The plaintiff patent
holder offered affidavits tending to show that -there was a long-standing
need for the invention, that the invention was initially regarded with
59. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
60. 501 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1974).
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skepticism by those knowledgeable in the field of branding, and that
the invention quickly achieved great commercial success. The plaintiff
also offered a statement signed by the author of the article stating that
the author had not conceived the idea of using ,the freezing technique
described in his article for the branding of cattle at the time he wrote
the article. The trial judge considered these affidavits and statements
but still ruled that the patent was invalid on the motion for summary
judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.
A similar result was reached in Speakman Co. v. Water Saver Fau-
cet Co., Inc., where the court of appeals said "We agree with -the trial
court's conclusion that commercial success is no substitute for invention
"961
DESIRABILITY OF A SINGLE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR PATENT CASES
While one year's decisions in a single circuit are an inadequate
basis for judgment, no examination of such a group of cases is com-
plete without consideration of their bearing on the vigorous arguments
of those who advocate the transfer of all patent appeals to a single spec-
ialized court of patent appeals, such as the existing Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. That court presently handles most appeals from
adverse Patent Office decisions.62  If the decisions handed down by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals during this past term are any in-
dication of how patent appeals are generally handled in the courts of
appeals, it appears there is no need for such a specialized court.
It is unlikely that a specialized court would perform more skillfully. If
the technical difficulties of determining patent validity and infringe-
ment are unduly burdensome for the district court judges, as some
maintain," then the determination of validity and infringement should
be referred to the Patent Office. For example, a statutory provision
could be enacted which would enable any district court judge to appoint
a patent examiner to serve as a special master in any patent litigation
where the judge required technical assistance in determining patent
validity and infringement. The findings of such a master would then
be reviewable by the district court judge. Other issues germane to pat-
61. 497 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1974).
62. Proposals For Single Patent Court Being Studied By Federal Commission, 180
PAT., T.M. & C.R.J. A-9-13 (May 30, 1974).
63. See 59 A.B.A.J. 106 (1973). See also Gansewitz, Toward Patent-Experienced
Judges, 58 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1972).
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ent litigation, such as licensing and antitrust issues, would still be de-
cided by the district court judge as they are now.
The establishment of a national court of appeals for patent cases
might reduce the forum-shopping aspects of patent practice, but it may
be doubted that it would improve the quality of the appellate decisions,
at least in the Seventh Circuit. The high quality of the patent work
performed in the Seventh Circuit at least suggests that careful and de-
tailed examination should be made of a good sample of patent decisions
in the federal courts before the proponents of change should be con-
ceded victory.
